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Developing Foreign Bond Markets:  
The Arirang Bond Experience in Korea 
 
 
This study investigates the development of Korea’s foreign bond (Arirang) market for 
won-denominated foreign bonds. We provide an institutional perspective and discuss 
the problems, concerns and key issues related to the development of this market. We 
find no evidence that Arirang issuance either crowded out local debt or had exchange 
rate implications. Overall, the Korean experience provides valuable lessons for other 
emerging nations seeking to build bond markets for local and foreign issuers. 
Instigating market development demands an enabling infrastructure, the nurturing of 
local and international demand and the deregulation of capital flows. This process is 
demanding, as the sophistication of the local bond market does not make it appealing 
to foreign borrowers per se. 
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Developing Foreign Bond Markets: 
The Arirang Bond Experience in Korea 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The 1997 financial crisis gave a major boost to regional and domestic bond markets 
across East Asia as alternatives to bank intermediation. Market volumes have 
increased two-fold or more, and corporate issuance has expanded hand-in-hand with 
the government bond market. In several countries, including Korea and Malaysia, the 
size of the corporate bond market has even caught up with that in the US as a 
percentage of GDP. Nonetheless, the development of local markets remains modest 
by the standards of those in more developed countries. There also remains 
considerable variation in the scale and scope of financial markets more generally 
within the region.  
 
One critical market segment already present in a small group of advanced financial 
markets remains largely overlooked: the presence of foreign bond issuers. High credit 
quality borrowers such as banks, prime name corporations (e.g. IBM, Disney and GE 
Finance) and supranational organizations (e.g. Asian Development Bank and the 
World Bank) are well-known for the diversity of their international bond offerings 
and issue actively in many countries. Those countries in the Asia-Pacific region with 
developed foreign bond markets are the financial centres of Singapore and Hong 
Kong, and the developed countries of Japan and Australia. Of the crisis economies 
that implemented radical regulatory change, only Korea has made some progress in 
instigating issuance by foreign borrowers. 
 
The objective of this paper is to provide an insight into bond market development by 
considering the case of Korea’s foreign bond market1. Korea has actively pursued the 
expansion of its domestic market both in the corporate and government segments, 
while also trying to encourage non-resident issuance by way of won (W) denominated 
Arirang bonds. The Arirang market nonetheless remains small, constituting less than 
0.2% of corporate issuance, or around US$250 million. The Korean experience holds 
                                                 
1 Also see Hoschka (2005) for further discussion on the importance of the role of Multilateral 
Development Banks (MDBs). 
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important policy lessons for other emerging countries that intend to or have already 
set out to develop their local markets, and demands the attention of issuers, investors 
and regulators alike. 
 
Why should the development of foreign bond markets be such a key issue? Initially, it 
can be regarded as a barometer of general development in the respective local 
markets. Consensus is now uniform that banks and markets can co-exist efficiently 
even in otherwise bank-oriented financial systems (Levine, 1997; Boyd and Smith, 
1998; Bolton and Freixas, 2000; Ongena and Smith, 2000; Allen and Santomero, 
2001). The benefits of a competitive bond market are abundant. It may lead to lower 
funding costs, improved resource allocation, more efficient corporate capital 
structures and better encouragement of innovation (Takagi, 2002). Crucially for the 
post-crisis economies of East Asia, competition for borrowers reduces the dependence 
of firms on banking relationships (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998) and induces banks to 
lend to lower quality borrowers they would otherwise refuse (Dinc, 2000). On the 
whole, better market mechanisms should aid risk sharing in the financial system, 
improving its ability to withstand prolonged volatility shocks. 
 
The obvious obstacles that need to be overcome to build bond markets are identified 
by a range of studies, including Benzie (1992), Emery (1997), Schinasi and Todd-
Smith (1998), Kim (1999) and Batten and Kim (2001). Issues and impediments are 
recounted in terms of supply (providing an enabling environment, maintaining the 
reform of corporate governance), demand (strengthening the role of institutional 
investors, considering private placement as a short-term option) as well as 
infrastructural development (better information disclosure, reliable credit ratings, 
robust benchmark yield curves, quality settlement and risk management systems). The 
building of bond markets also demands a strong legal and regulatory framework, and 
better property rights and bankruptcy laws in particular (Beck, Levine and Loayza, 
2000). The shared characteristic of the four major bond markets in the Asia-Pacific 
region is the presence and complex interplay of these factors. 
 
Ultimately, foreign bond markets only emerge when local market conditions are 
otherwise highly evolved. Accordingly, when taken from a regional perspective there 
is apparent correlation between bond market development and issuance by foreign 
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borrowers. It is thus striking that the sophisticated Korean bond market developed 
with minimal foreign involvement. The benefits of an evolved Arirang market are 
potentially vast. It should help foreign borrowers to currency-match foreign assets, or 
simply provide an alternative source of funds that can be swapped into the currency of 
choice when windows of opportunity appear. Foreign bonds could ultimately be an 
important vehicle to promote cross-border investment, but also make the local Korean 
bond market larger, more liquid and more resilient to the recent occurrence of 
continual boom and bust cycles. The present conditions discourage such activity, 
amplified by cumbersome access, weaknesses in institutional arrangements and 
governance concerns. This is despite no systematic or institutional discrimination 
against foreign bond issues. Potential concerns voiced over the expansion of Arirang 
issuance are also unfounded; foreign bonds neither crowd out local offerings nor have 
destabilizing exchange rate effects. 
 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review the key features of 
Korea’s bond market with focus mainly on the corporate segment Arirang bonds also 
belong to from a regulatory perspective. In Section 3 we discuss the problems, 
concerns and key issues related specifically to the Arirang market, and strategies 
directed at further development are considered. The final section allows for 
conclusions and lessons that may be applied to other financial markets. 
 
2. The Korean bond market 
 
The foundations of the Korean government bond market were laid in the early 1950s. 
Corporate bonds appeared in 1963, but issuance was repressed, restricted to short 
maturities and effectively dependent on bank guarantees.  Not until the mid-1990s did 
prospects for development strengthen, as the market started opening up to foreign 
investors in 1994 and was later fully liberalized in 19972. The real trigger to market 
development and liberalization was the currency crisis of the same year. From the late 
1980s, the government bond market had been hampered by continual current account 
surpluses, and the Treasury market never really took off as a result. Instead, quasi-
government securities dominated to assist monetary and exchange rate stability and 
                                                 
2 The evolution of regulatory control over the Korean bond market is described by Noland (2005). 
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housing development. At this stage, chaebol-issued corporate bonds constituted by far 
the largest segment of the Korean bond market, but the thin Treasury segment meant 
that these were priced using the three-year corporate yield as the benchmark. 
 
The currency crisis brought about fundamental changes in the market. The 
government had to raise huge funds for fiscal stimulation and financial restructuring, 
which induced rapid expansion in all segments of the public bond market. In 1998, the 
issuance of Treasuries alone increased six-fold to W 12.5 trillion. Corporate issuance 
also jumped to a staggering W 56 trillion but underwent an altogether different 
transformation. Namely, firms had to shift borrowing to non-guaranteed securities, as 
troubled financial institutions were reluctant to extend credit lines or provide credit 
guarantees. Large quantities of asset-backed securities (ABSs) were simultaneously 
issued to securitize non-performing loans and credit card receivables, creating one of 
the most sophisticated structured finance markets in the region. The huge surge of 
fund inflows to investment trust companies (ITCs) secured ample demand for these 
securities. 
 
The infrastructure surrounding the market was built up gradually. Market operations 
are overseen by the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) and the Financial 
Supervisory Commission (FSC). Since 1998, the Bank of Korea holds only indirect 
and limited powers through the supervision of payment and settlement systems and 
foreign exchange reserves. Organizations such as the Korea Securities Dealers 
Association (KSDA), the Korea Exchange (KRX) and the Korea Securities 
Depository (KSD) are entitled to self-regulate the securities market. Credit ratings are 
now assigned by four local agencies, including Korea Investor Service (KIS, a 
Moody’s affiliate), Korea Ratings (KR, a Fitch affiliate), National Information & 
Credit Evaluation (NICE) and Seoul Credit Rating & Information (SCI). The 
underwriting market has also grown competitive, with Dealogic data showing ten 
bookrunners with a market share of at least 3.5%.3. 
 
 (Insert Table 1) 
 
                                                 
3 The two largest underwriters are the Korea Development Bank and Woori Finance, a subsidiary of 
Woori Bank. 
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Today, Korea’s bond market is the second largest in East Asia (Table 1). In dollar 
terms, the market was valued at US$ 599.8 billion or 81% of GDP in June 2005, a 
nearly five-fold increase over 1997. It is also certainly the most diverse in the region, 
with 26% of its volume comprised by corporate securities and another 44% by 
financial institution bonds. These figures do not account for non-Treasury public 
bonds and ABSs, which add almost US$ 400 billion to the value of the market. Quasi-
government securities include vast volumes of Monetary Stabilization Bonds, Foreign 
Exchange Stabilization Bonds, National Housing Bonds and special public bonds 
issued largely to finance infrastructural improvements in transport, electricity and 
telecommunications. 
 
(Insert Table 2) 
 
The growth in the corporate bond market has been similarly astounding despite 
coming to a halt in recent years. The market is unconcentrated but remains moderately 
diverse, as issuance is dominated by chaebols and their subsidiaries. Accordingly, 
credit quality in the market is very high and increasing in local terms, where the 
government is rated AAA4 (see Table 2). The bonds issued tend to be straight, 
unsecured and now almost exclusively non-guaranteed. Equity-linked instruments, 
predominantly convertibles, are relatively rare, with only 42 listed on the KRX. In 
total, the KRX lists over 2,400 corporate bonds, of which more than 90% are 
unsecured straight issues. Most securities are in fact listed, but this is largely a 
formality induced by restrictions on institutional investors investing in unlisted bonds. 
As in the public market, corporate issuance continues to be concentrated at the shorter 
end of the maturity spectrum, with three-year bonds remaining the most popular. 
 
(Insert Table 3) 
 
The low concentration of issuance limits liquidity in the market to some extent. In 
2005, the average issue size was about US$ 40 million. Turnover is still relatively 
high at 3.3 in government bonds and 1.0 in corporate securities, the latter being the 
                                                 
4 Korea sovereign rating in local currency is AA at Fitch Ratings and A+ at Standard and Poor’s. Both 
agencies apply a country ceiling of AA- to Korean issuers. Korea’s foreign currency rating is A+ and 
Fitch, A at Standard and Poor’s and A3 at Moody’s. 
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highest in East Asia. Table 3 nonetheless shows that trading in corporate bonds has 
declined by nearly 75% since 1999. As in most countries, the vast majority of 
corporate bond trades take place over-the-counter (OTC), administered largely 
through the KSDA Free Board. Only 1.6% of trades are accounted for by the KRX, 
which reflects the low standardizability of corporate issues. 
 
The remarkable reduction in corporate bond trading is deceptive, as it simply reflects 
turnover settling down after a series of runs between 1999 and 2003. Ferocious 
trading in the market was fed by three major shocks. Each of these was triggered by a 
sudden downgrade (Daewoo, Hyundai, SK Group and LG Card), a run on ITCs by 
households and firms, distress sales of bonds and eventually government intervention 
(Jiang and McCauley, 2004). Corporate issuance has never really recovered since 
then, as firms could no longer delay a much-needed process of deleveraging. At least, 
this encourages hope that future growth in the market will be underpinned by much 
healthier conditions. 
(Insert Table 4) 
 
The vast changes in the corporate bond investor base are demonstrated in Table 4. In 
1998, the huge rush of capital inflows helped ITCs lift their market share to 62%. By 
September 2005, the reversal of capital flows reduced the same to just 14%. The 
disposals were absorbed primarily by yield-driven investors such as small mutual 
savings banks and credit unions, reflecting their appetite for relatively high returns in 
exchange for modest default risk. The corporate bond holdings of banks and insurance 
firms have also increased over time. 
 
On the whole, market conditions remain unattractive to foreign investors, which hold 
less than 0.5% of both corporate bonds and Treasuries. This owes only partly to the 
market’s vulnerability to climate changes and past capital controls. Due to 
withholding tax considerations, foreign participation is reduced to the futures rather 
than the spot market. More importantly, global portfolios stay away simply because 
the Korean won is not internationalized and offers no diversification benefits. As a 
result, even the government’s ability to borrow abroad in won remains severely 
limited, which Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003) call “original sin”. 
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3. General conditions surrounding the Arirang market 
 
3.1 The present and concerns over the Arirang market 
 
Arirang bonds could be an important vehicle to promote the internationalization of 
Korea’s capital markets and make the local bond markets larger and more liquid, thus 
more resilient. In a strict sense, the attractiveness of foreign-issued bonds lies with 
their ability to assist the currency matching of Korean assets. This should help 
encourage cross-border investment significantly in the medium term. However, the 
potential of the market is amplified further if we consider it merely an alternative 
channel to the vast savings accumulated in Korea’s financial system. Creditworthy 
foreign institutions could raise cheap Korean funds via local won-denominated 
issuance, and then simply swap these, via cross-currency and interest rate swaps, into 
the currency of choice when windows of opportunity appear in domestic and 
international markets. 
 
Regrettably, the Arirang market remains unable to serve the specific financing needs 
of foreign borrowers, and constitutes barely 0.2% of the corporate bond market it is 
part of from a regulatory perspective. This corresponds to the minimal cross-border 
appeal Korean bonds and the won already have to foreign investors. It is notable that 
the Arirang market faces no competition from won Eurobonds either, as is the case 
with Japan’s Samurai market. Non-resident issuance directly in a foreign currency is 
also not a viable option as yet, given that the introduction of so-called Kimchi bonds, 
denominated in US dollars, is still at the development stage. 
 
(Insert Table 5) 
 
Details on all the Arirang bonds that have been issued to date are provided in Table 5. 
The first foreign borrower to tap Korea’s domestic market was the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) in 1995 with a seven-year issue serviced by the Korea 
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Development Bank5. Two more supranational organizations followed in 1997, but 
they have been absent from the market since then. Not until 1999 were foreign firms 
allowed to issue Arirang bonds, pursuant to the Foreign Exchange Market 
Liberalization Act of the same year. 
 
In total, the Reuters Fixed Income Database recounts only 32 Arirang issues since 
their inception. The market gathered some momentum initially, but the outstanding 
volume quickly dropped from a high of W 815.6 billion in 2001 to W 235 billion in 
2005. There is no evidence of any systematic or institutional discrimination against 
foreign bond issues. Nonetheless, issuance has been dominated by the foreign 
subsidiaries of Korean chaebols, which tap the already familiar market to achieve 
favourable funding conditions. This is in sharp contrast with other foreign bond 
markets in the region, where the bulk of issuance is accounted for by supranationals 
and genuine non-resident borrowers of typically high credit quality. Unexpectedly, 
Arirang bonds are also comparable to local securities. Each corporate issue was rated 
BBB or A by local credit rating agencies. Markey activity has been concentrated at 
the one- to three-year segment, and the average issue size is a modest W 47 billion. 
Straight issues dominate, though five bonds by the US subsidiary of SKC had put 
features. 
 
In the remainder of this section, we discuss the roots of underdevelopment in the 
Arirang market. However, we feel compelled to first emphasize that any potential 
concerns voiced over the expansion of Arirang issuance are largely unfounded. 
Despite the recent ailing of domestic issuance by Korean firms, there is no evidence 
that foreign bonds would crowd out local offerings. In fact, the reverse may be the 
case. In the yield-driven Korean market, the significant sector issues by local firms 
and financial institutions may inhibit price opportunities for foreign borrowers, which 
would typically be on the quality end of the market. This problem could be mitigated 
in a number of ways. For example, coordinated regional central bank investment in 
foreign-issued securities could not only stimulate demand, but also absorb much of 
the US dollar-denominated reserve buildup in the region. A framework similar to the 
                                                 
5 See Hoschka (2006) for further information on MDB financing (specifically Table 1, page 9) 
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Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Trust Fund set up to assist East Asia’s post-crisis 
economies would probably serve this purpose well. 
 
Another potential problem relates to Korea’s relatively thin foreign exchange market. 
Evidence from other financial markets suggests that most foreign bond issues are 
swapped into foreign currencies. The same holds in Korea, where chaebol subsidiaries 
tap the local market and then swap the proceeds into US dollars. If these transactions 
are relatively large, they could strengthen exchange rate volatility and exert 
undesirably large downward pressure on the Korean won.   
 
(Insert Figure 1) 
 
To see if this is a significant issue, we conduct an econometric (event study) analysis 
on the impact the few Arirang issues have had on the dollar-won exchange rate. Over 
0 to 30-day event windows, Arirang issuance has no apparent effect in terms of 
returns or volatility (Figures 1a and 1b, respectively). For example, a comparison of 
volatility and returns 5 days before and 5 days after issuance shows no statistically 
significant differences. Of course, the sample is small and the issues are small, but so 
too is the market, and the confidence interval at the 95% level includes most 
observations. In Figure 1b, there does appear a spike in returns on day 0. Also, the 
mean returns are negative 2 days before but positive 2 days after issuance. A 95% 
confidence interval again includes all these points, however (since not all bonds had 
the same effect). To the extent that price discovery in markets is usually associated 
with a spike in volatility around the event date, this simple analysis ultimately shows 
no evidence of such spikes when Arirang bonds are issued. 
 
To repeat this experiment for other markets is difficult given the number of issues and 
their interaction with other external factors. In Singapore, institutions have been 
historically reluctant to short the local currency due to reporting requirements and 
meticulous overseeing by the Monetary Authority (MAS). Thus, it is unlikely that the 
liquidity effects of foreign bond issues would be arbitraged. In Hong Kong, this is an 
irrelevant issue altogether given the peg to the US dollar. In the case of Australia and 
Japan, which both have large offsetting capital and trade flows and well-developed 
and informed foreign exchange markets, any such effect would be hard to imagine. 
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3.2 Economic and financial conditions surrounding the Arirang market 
 
The development of the Arirang market is obviously dependent upon expectations 
over Korea’s economy as a whole. Domestic economic growth is expected to 
maintain a moderate rate of growth of 4 to 5%, which should underpin demand and 
supply both in the corporate and Treasury segments of the bond market. The overall 
picture of Treasury issuance is an interplay between proposed fiscal initiatives that 
would add to the expanding government deficit, and concerns over the current 
account surplus and the build-up of foreign reserves. Korea’s foreign reserves are the 
fourth largest in the world at US$ 210.4 billion in 2005 and continue to be fed by 
continual current account surpluses, estimated at US$ 16.6 billion or 2.1% of GDP. 
 
On the whole, there are visible signs of improved confidence by foreign investors. 
Inbound foreign direct investment (FDI) was US$ 11.6 billion in 2005, and Korea has 
broken into the top 20 of the global FDI attractiveness ranking6. Favourably, high 
value-added FDI dominates, and the majority of inbound investment is made through 
mergers and acquisitions. Coupled with foreign portfolio investment, foreign 
shareholdings have now risen to 45% of the KRX market capitalization. Capital 
inflows are only partially offset by outbound FDI, which the government continues to 
encourage to reduce upward pressure on the won. The government is also using 
Foreign Exchange Stabilization Bonds to prevent the won appreciating, but the 
currency now trades consistently below 1,000 against the US dollar for the first time 
since 1997.  
 
To date, there is little evidence that FDI-related expenditure would be financed 
though Arirang issuance. But, the expected future flow of inbound FDI could provide 
a basis for foreign participation in the market. Regrettably, at this stage the enabling 
environment to do so is lacking. The evolution of the bond market in general and the 
Arirang market in particular is subject to a series of enabling factors and impediments. 
                                                 
6 The FDI attractiveness ranking is compiled by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). 
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The environmental conditions critical to encourage Arirang issuance are discussed in 
turn. 
 
(a) Importance of sustainable economic growth and declining default risk 
A stable economic situation matched with reduced corporate leverage creates 
expectations of earnings upgrades within corporate borrowers. The reduction of 
corporate debt to equity ratios has been remarkable, from 182% in 2001 to 104% in 
2004, and the default ratio has declined to below 0.1 (Lee and Kim, 2006). Since 
2004, credit spreads have remained near historical lows and narrowed spectacularly in 
the BBB-segment. This makes the market more attractive to both domestic and 
foreign issuers. However, it is likely to reduce yield-oriented investor demand for 
Arirang issuance by top quality international borrowers. 
 
(b) Accommodating declining savings and high levels of consumer credit 
Korea’s savings rate has stabilized in recent years but is on the decline from a long-
term perspective. It dropped quite dramatically between 1998 and 2002, from 38% to 
30%, due to credit card abuse which triggered the collapse of LG Credit Card in 2003. 
To some extent, this reflects that household capacity to invest in securities other than 
through reinvestment or asset substitution remains limited. The same is also apparent 
from the relatively low level of quasi money in Korea. The supply of quasi money, 
which comprises currency not deposited in bank accounts and demand deposits of the 
central bank, continues to grow. However, at 62% of GDP in 2004 it remains well 
below levels seen in many other countries in the region, including China, Taiwan, 
Malaysia and Thailand. On the positive side, real income growth has been the highest 
in Korea behind China and Vietnam since 1998. 
 
(c) Improvements in the quality of corporate governance 
Korean efforts to improve corporate governance show some success but remain 
heavily criticized. Korea’s governance practices are ranked only sixth among ten 
Asian countries by the Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA) and CLSA 
Asia-Pacific Markets7. The country complies well with international accounting and 
auditing standards, and was the first to pass a law allowing class action lawsuits for 
                                                 
7 In 2005 the ranking was in descending order: Singapore, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Taiwan, 
Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, China and Indonesia. 
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securities cases. However, it fares generally badly in the passing and implementation 
of regulations, the quality of regulatory and market-based enforcement and the 
political and regulatory environment. Korea also scores lower in the World Bank 
Governance Indicators than do many of its regional counterparts, including Japan, 
Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. Improvements are called for in the country’s 
regulatory efficiency, rule of law and control of corruption in particular8. 
 
Reforms to the governance culture of Korean firms are also criticized as largely 
superficial, as ownership structures are opaque and independent institutional investors 
remain unorganized. Standard & Poor’s has indicated that complex family-centered 
ownership and support to non-core subsidiaries harm corporate credit ratings. A prime 
case is Samsung Electronics, which is currently rated A- but could theoretically have 
a higher rating than does Korea as a sovereign borrower. The efforts of governance-
aware professionals and academics, and retail activists such as the People’s Solidarity 
for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) have nonetheless brought increasing attention 
these issues. 
 
(d) Relative stability in monetary policy and the exchange rate 
Overall, the domestic economic picture is favourable and the financial environment 
benign to potential issuers in the Arirang market. Price stability is also reasonable, 
contributing to the generally benevolent conditions. Domestic demand pressures 
remain slight as households are deleveraging and credit delinquency is falling. More 
concern is voiced over the recent appreciation of the Korean won. Unhedged foreign 
borrowers would be reluctant to tap Korea’s domestic market if the won was likely to 
appreciate beyond the interest rate differential with the issuer’s reporting currency. In 
2005, the won traded between 1,463 and 1,209 against the euro and 1,061 and 959 
against the US dollar, gaining some 2.3% against the latter year-on-year. The dollar 
exchange rate is nonetheless stable, with 2005 volatility the lowest in the post-crisis 
period. Further rises in the exchange rate are also expected to remain modest, as 
indicated by the small net outflow of foreign portfolio investment in 2005. 
 
                                                 
8 The World Bank publishes six governance indicators bi-yearly for 209 countries: rule of law, voice 
and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality and control of corruption (see http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata) 
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3.3 Critical Issues to Further Bond Market Development 
 
In the face of the generally benign environment and regulatory encouragement, it is 
obvious that the lack of substantial Arirang issuance owes to a set of very specific 
factors. We summarize the explicit enabling factors and impediments in three areas: 
supply, demand and infrastructure. 
 
A. Issuer Concerns 
 
(a) Pricing is imperative 
As has been mentioned, the investor market in Korea is characterized by an 
increasingly aggressive search for higher yields. Foreign issuers would likely be at the 
quality end, possibly rated higher than the government’s sovereign rating, thus pricing 
remains an unhappy issue. The on-going expansion of the government bond market 
may also induce considerable crowding-out effects. Pricing at the long end of the 
yield curve can be problematic, as the pricing benchmark is the three-year Treasury 
bond. 
 
(b) The ability to hedge via cross-currency swaps is imperative 
Korea’s cross-currency swap market has evolved significantly in the past few years. 
The interbank trading of foreign currency derivatives alone reached a daily US$ 3.6 
billion in 2005, doubling over the previous year and tripling over 2003. The Bank of 
Korea attributes heightened activity, more than 70% of which is accounted for by 
swap trades, to greater demand for hedging from trade-oriented local firms. 
Nonetheless, the market remains shallow relative to Hong Kong and Singapore where 
trading is more than ten times higher. As a result, pricing is said to be intermittent and 
spreads often wide. 
 
(c) Simple to understand documentation is important 
The language barrier is non-existent for chaebol subsidiaries but is highly problematic 
for non-Korean firms. This makes much of the documentation, governing law and 
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legal procedures largely inaccessible to foreigners9. Compliance with issuing 
procedures has equally been cited as being unduly complex. The requirement to 
translate foreign documents into Korean is onerous. Also, there have been 15 
revisions to the “Regulation on Securities Issuance and Disclosure” rules since 2000, 
and the three most recent revisions are not available in English. These issues are 
substantial and are a major hindrance to the conduciveness of the bond market to non-
resident issuance. 
 
(d) The need for domestic ratings is problematic 
All foreign issuers must be rated by one of the local credit rating agencies, 
irrespective of whether they have already been rated by Moody’s or Standard and 
Poor’s. This introduces considerable delays in the issuing process. In a recent 
example, Ford Capital was interested in issuing the won equivalent of US$200 million 
in June 2003. Salomon Smith Barney was selected as the main agency, and KIS and 
NICE were requested to provide appropriate ratings. However, documentation and 
financials were required in Korean and the various participants were unable to act 
promptly. In the meantime, the opportunity to achieve sub-LIBOR borrowing rates 
had changed, so Ford Capital did not proceed with the issue. For supranationals, the 
issuing procedure can be easier, as new issues can be classified as a government bond 
or a special bond. 
 
 
B. Investor concerns 
 
(a) The need to maintain market size and liquidity 
The limited scope of the Arirang market severely limits its appeal to domestic and 
foreign investors alike. A critical condition would be to attract large issues that induce 
high levels of liquidity, but the average issue size, comparable for local and Arirang 
bonds, is too small to ensure this. 
 
                                                 
9  For example, the Korean Financial Supervisory Service notes the following disclaimer: “The English 
translation of the financial supervisory regulations is not official and is intended for reference only. 
Neither the FSC nor the FSS is responsible for the correctness of the English translation, and the reader 
is advised to refer to the most up-to-date regulations in Korean. The English translation is current as of 
August 1, 2002”. See: http://english.fss.or.kr/en/laws/sec/lawstock_l.jsp 
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(b) Pricing structure – simple is not necessarily the best 
The Arirang market, like the corporate bond market in general, is very homogeneous 
and does not cater to a broad horizon of investors. This is driven in part by the fairly 
specific nature of local demand. On the other hand, domestic borrowers also prefer to 
stick to standard terms and concentrate issuance at the short end of the market. 
 
(c) The ability to diversify 
Korean bonds offer some scope for diversification since their dollar returns co-move 
only moderately with US returns (McCauley and Jiang, 2004). However, the won 
itself has no diversification benefits to most investors, thus global portfolios stay 
away from won-denominated debt. As has been mentioned, this owes largely to the 
fact that the internationalization of the won is minimal despite the size of Korea’s 
economy. Nonetheless, to the extent that the won is perceived to be undervalued 
against the dollar, speculators should be encouraged to hold long positions in the 
currency. We have seen no evidence for this in the corporate bond market so far, 
though foreign participation in the three-year government bond futures market is 
significant. 
 
(d) Withholding tax deters foreign investors 
Interest income is subject to 14% withholding tax for resident and 25% for foreign 
investors. For foreigners, the tax amount may be reduced or exempted by applicable 
tax treaties or agreements with the domiciliary country. Nonetheless, withholding tax 
may be a larger barrier than the rates levied or the bilateral arrangements might 
suggest. An important consideration is that foreign investors simply do not want to 
submit themselves to the administrative burden of taking advantage of tax treaty 
rights (McCauley and Jiang, 2004). 
 
(e) Poor governance and investor protection inhibits (foreign) investment 
In the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, many investors were unable to recover their 
claims due to legal systems that insufficiently supported investor rights. This problem 
persists even under normal conditions. The likelihood of bankruptcy filings has been 
shown to be lower when creditor rights are weaker and the judicial system less 
efficient (Claessens, Djankov, and Klapper, 2003). This is of some concern in Korea. 
Strictly speaking, creditor protection is reasonably strong as measured by creditor 
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rights (La Porta et al., 1998) and the resolution of claims disputes (Djankov, McLiesh 
and Shleifer, 2004). However, this does not make up for the regulatory and 
governance inadequacies criticized by the ACGA and the World Bank. Investor 
confidence is also hurt by the explicitly aggressive growth strategy of certain Korean 
firms such as Hyundai Motor. The effect of these uncertainties is reflected in (a) 
investor reluctance to hold certain securities and (b) relatively higher credit spreads on 
corporate bonds. 
 
 
C. Infrastructural issues 
 
Despite concerted regulatory efforts, the present infrastructure in Korea could ill-
support a large and sophisticated foreign bond market. This is reflected in Korea’s 
generally low rating in the ALBI Impediments Index10, which assesses the difficulty 
of accessing bond markets in ten Asian countries. Korea ranks only seventh, well 
behind Indonesia, Thailand and even the Philippines. It scores especially badly in 
currency and capital restrictions, the complexity of withholding tax and the ease of 
setting up and operating an investment fund. The country also receives criticism for 
infrastructural conditions in pricing, transparency, settlement and custody, derivative 
markets and hedging. 
 
(a) The technical infrastructure is critical 
The Korean Government is aware of the need to maintain and lengthen liquidity along 
the yield curve, and preferably to concentrate issuance in particular maturity buckets. 
New Treasury issues are allocated reasonably evenly across 3 maturities; three-year 
bonds are still the most popular, but five- and ten-year bonds are quickly gaining. This 
evidently contributes to increasingly better pricing in the corporate bond market. On 
the other hand, many non-pricing-related concerns prevail among foreign market 
participants in particular, such as the limited availability of offsetting risk 
management technologies. 
 
                                                 
10 Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) produce the ALBI (Asian Local Bank 
Index), which tracks the total return of liquid bonds in local regional economies. 
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The absence of floating rate markets is a notable shortcoming. There is also no clear 
development plan for simple exchange-traded and over-the-counter derivatives. For 
example, there are delays in the introduction of interest rate futures and other 
derivatives that are linked in some way to benchmark bond curves to facilitate risk 
management and trading. There are nonetheless several recent initiatives targeted at 
enhancing price discovery. The first of these is to increase the use of floating-rate 
measures, which would eventually lead to the expansion of floating-rate instruments 
(forward rate agreements and possibly short-dated futures). This process began in 
2004 with the introduction of KORIBOR (Korea Interbank Offered Rate), the Korean 
counterpart of LIBOR, which should form the benchmark interest rate for short-term 
financing for banks, and may become a reference rate for bond or swap transactions. 
KORIBOR is fixed by taking the average of the middle eight of 14 quotes from 
contributing banks. 
 
The Korea Securities Depository (KSD) has yet to complete the full reform of 
corporate bond trading, settlement and custody. The foundations of the bond 
registration system were laid by the Registration Act back in 1993. The KSD is finally 
moving towards the full dematerialization of corporate bonds and is working on the 
introduction of electronic trading. It has also allowed listed won-denominated 
corporate issues to be used in repo transactions, which should contribute to greater 
liquidity in the market. 
 
(b) Capital controls need further attention 
Capital controls still exist in Korea and are recounted by Noland (2005). For example, 
there remain limits of foreign won funding aimed at hedge funds. For foreigners, the 
sale and purchase of foreign exchange without documentation are subject to 
notification requirements over US$ 20,000 and US$ 10,000, respectively. The 
government’s exchange rate policy and the magnitude of currency market 
interventions also go beyond smoothing operations and have been a source of 
controversy. It is important that capital controls have been broadly responsible for the 
significant buildup of foreign reserves, thus their effectiveness needs to be 
reconsidered. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that illegal money transfers abroad 
are both common and considerable, totaling US$ 1.2 billion in the first half of 2004 
(all-up legal transfers over the past years come to US$ 6 billion). 
 19
 (c) Reform agenda 
The government hopes to secure Seoul’s position as an international financial centre 
by working towards full foreign currency liberalization by 2011. The first phase of the 
Foreign Exchange Liberalization Plan (2002 to 2005) has increased Korean won 
funding limits for non-residents and raised the ceiling amount of residents’ foreign 
borrowings requiring notification. Meanwhile, policy measures are being 
implemented step-by-step to deepen and widen the foreign exchange market, such as 
allowing securities firms into interbank and over-the-counter foreign exchange 
derivatives trading, and forging business coalitions between domestic and foreign 
brokerage firms. By the time the plan is implemented, the government hopes to have 
internationalized the won, and made its foreign exchange market a leading financial 
hub in Asia-Pacific. 
 
The 2005 merger of the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE), the KOSDAQ Stock Market 
and the Korea Futures Exchange (KOFEX) into the Korea Exchange (KRX) is 
certainly expected upgrade the competitiveness of the nation’s trading system for a 
variety of financial products, including stocks, bonds, options and other derivatives. 
The KRX is easing further some of the restrictions on foreign equity investors, 
already accounting for more than 40% of the market. The internationalization of the 
stock market has done nothing to instigate foreign investment in Korean bonds, 
however. The policy of KRX is also unclear on how to encourage Arirang issuance 
other than by making easing listing requirements. The cornerstone of their strategy is 
to scrap the current rule that requires issuers to be listed on either foreign exchanges 
or have their depository receipts of foreign shares listed on the KRX, as long as the 
firm is issuing secured bonds with low risk of delinquency.  
 
 
 
4. Lessons and Conclusions 
 
Asia-Pacific governments targeting foreign bond issuance have seldom come up with 
apparent or specific development strategies. In the case of Korea, the government has 
vowed to continue reform of the domestic financial system, with the explicit objective 
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of turning Seoul into an international financial centre on par with Singapore and Hong 
Kong by 2010. One critical issue of this plan will be to develop Korea’s foreign bond 
market. At present, the negligible Arirang market appears untouched by quality 
issuers, which is surprising given the scale and scope of the local bond markets. 
 
Funding FDI or local currency portfolios appears to have little to do with why foreign 
firms enter a domestic bond market. Rather, borrowers seek out the minimum cost of 
financing amongst a spectrum of choices. This dictates that the appeal of Arirang 
issuance largely hinges upon the sophistication of Korea’s cross-currency swap 
market. As significant inroads are being made in this regard, the government must 
ensure that the other obstacles impeding easy access to the market are simultaneously 
removed. The tasks include the improvement of pricing conditions, the reduction of 
the administrative burden, the elimination of capital controls and encouraging local 
and international investor demand. 
 
For other East Asian governments seeking to develop their own foreign bond markets, 
there are numerous lessons to be learnt. They must formulate an infrastructure that is 
enabling for issuance and risk management, nurture institutional and retail demand, 
and deregulate capital markets to facilitate two-way capital flows. There appears to be 
a natural ordering to the tasks involved: (1) benchmark bonds and indices must be 
established; (2) a diverse derivatives market needs to be developed; (3) the bond 
market’s maturity profile must be systematically lengthened; and (4) OTC capability 
and esoteric prices structures must be built and developed for derivatives and other 
complex financial and financing instruments. 
 
The Korean experience also shows that the sophistication of the local bond market 
does not necessarily make it appealing to foreign borrowers. This warrants a several 
imperative observations: 
 
1. Development is driven by market forces and is difficult to simply regulate. 
The sophisticated bond markets of Australia, Hong Kong or Singapore have evolved 
over many years. Thus, the presence of the enabling infrastructure is only a first step 
in market development: one needs the right mix of issuer supply and investor demand. 
The case of Korea seems to support his view. Despite the conscious building of 
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infrastructure and the success of the corporate bond market, foreign issuance never 
really took off. There may be many reasons for this anomaly: complex regulatory, 
issuing and compliance processes, parochial investor attitude and possibly crowding-
out effects. 
 
2. Proper planning in conjunction with industry will help overcome some risks. 
In Australia, government withdrawal from the bond markets allowed foreign issuers 
to substitute at the quality end of the investment spectrum. The reverse appears to be 
the case in Korea; Treasury issuance appears to crowd out foreign borrowers despite 
low levels of government indebtedness. These problems could easily be overcome by 
filling in the infrastructural gaps and maintaining liquidity along the benchmark yield 
curve in conjunction with industry. 
 
3. An order of issuance helps build markets but it needs to be followed up. 
In Korea, corporate borrowers were not granted access to the Arirang market until 
four years after the first supranational issue. It is important to remember that the 
mandate of supranationals is to “provide cost-effective funding on a sustainable basis 
for financing economic development11”. Thus, they are driven to minimize funding 
costs and lack the ability to continuously cross-subsidize market development by 
regular issuance. 
 
4. Foreign issuers are driven by cost and do not necessarily fund FDI or portfolio 
investment through local issuance. 
Multinational firms pick financing arrangements very carefully. Chaebol subsidiaries 
issue Arirang bonds exactly to minimize the funding costs of foreign investment, and 
the Korean subsidiaries of foreign firms will likely do the reverse. Chaebols obviously 
have a comparative advantage at home, which they are able to transfer into lower 
costs in the host country. It is unsurprising that Indonesian chaebol subsidiaries are at 
the forefront of the Arirang market, as they would probably have difficulty accessing 
local debt and banking markets. 
 
                                                 
11 This is a quote from the World Bank website on their funding objectives, although it is consistent 
with others: 
http://treasury.worldbank.org/Services/Capital%2bMarkets/Annual+Issuance/Funding+Strategy+and+
Objectives.html 
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Finally, the insights provided by the Korean experience are imperative to the on-going 
reform of developed economies in Europe and Asia. In the new millennium, firms 
across the developed world are already faced with significant changes in the financial 
environment, as banks are increasingly cautious about extending credit. This has 
triggered a gradual process of disintermediation in historically bank-oriented financial 
regimes, fed by considerable regulatory efforts directed at market liberalization. In 
emerging markets, bank-intermediated finance continues to form the single most 
important source of funds to the corporate sector. However, they are subject to the 
same universal trend, which calls for immediate efforts to develop disintermediated 
financing channels. The Korean blueprint, with all its imperfections, should provide 
an excellent guide. 
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Table 1 
Financial Markets in Asia-Pacific  
(in US$ billions) 
 1997 2005 
  Government Corporate Financial Total
% of 
GDP  Government Corporate Financial Total 
% of 
GDP
China 67.4 6.3 42.7 116.4 12.9 331.8 12.2 208.0 552.0 31.5
Hong Kong 13.1 32.7  45.8 26.4 16.0 66.9  82.9 48.7
Indonesia 0.9 2.0 1.7 4.6 1.9 48.5 3.8 2.9 55.2 20.6
Korea 21.6 57.1 51.7 130.4 25.1 183.5 155.0 261.3 599.8 81.0
Malaysia 19.4 20.8 16.8 57.0 56.4 49.2 45.6 20.3 115.1 93.2
Philippines 16.6 0.3  16.9 20.5 35.8 0.1 0.2 36.1 39.4
Singapore 13.0 10.7  23.7 24.9 45.1 34.5  79.6 71.4
Thailand 0.3 9.0 1.1 10.5 6.6 34.7 22.6 14.8 72.1 42.3
Vietnam       4.3   4.3 10.0
Japan 2,383 578 1,650 4,608 116 6,929 836 1,516 9,281 187
US 4,452 1,889 5,528 11,870 143 5,697 2,659 11,192 19,548 158
 
Sources: Asian Development Bank, Dealogic Bondware, Bank for International Settlements. 
 
Table 2 
Outstanding bonds in Korea by type 
(in W billions) 
 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total 547,449 600,139 650,110 736,160 805,776 
Government 78,126 95,808 137,677 197,932 234,126 
Treasuries 46,032 52,389 82,427 142,421 180,855 
FX Stabilization Bonds 8,700 15,850 23,650 22,200 15,300 
National Housing Bonds 21,268 26,469 31,001 33,311 37,376 
Municipal 9,246 8,954 9,939 10,553 11,210 
Special Public 134,343 133,417 118,286 115,288 117,191 
Monetary Stabilization Bonds 79,121 83,890 105,497 142,729 155,235 
Financial Debentures 83,660 120,898 123,963 134,854 145,523 
Corporate 162,953 157,172 154,748 134,804 142,492 
Guaranteed 5,987 4,862 3,364 755 323 
Secured 64,060 63,454 63,121 48,878 40,704 
AAA 9,384 15,618 16,369 15,542 14,583 
AA 16,862 16,219 18,259 23,604 31,633 
A 19,232 20,145 21,431 22,851 29,664 
BBB 20,565 16,823 15,779 16,008 17,686 
BB 7,855 6,446 5,506 1,251 1,075 
B 4,454 3,589 1,592 457 432 
CCC-D 3,545 1,178 536 345 291 
 
Source: Korea BondWeb. 
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Table 3 
Government and corporate bond trading in Korea 
(in W billions) 
 
 Government bonds Corporate bonds 
  
Over-the-
counter 
Exchange 
trading 
% Exchange 
trading 
Over-the-
counter 
Exchange 
trading 
% Exchange 
trading 
1997 15,848.6 237.4 1.5% 143,423.1 3,807.1 2.6% 
1998 44,554.8 6,519.9 12.8% 391,951.9 8,968.9 2.2% 
1999 397,504.4 281,921.7 41.5% 442,891.0 11,685.0 2.6% 
2000 582,662.0 23,521.2 3.9% 272,401.0 3,648.4 1.3% 
2001 985,028.0 12,213.6 1.2% 263,376.0 2,012.6 0.8% 
2002 731,811.0 46,062.8 5.9% 223,808.0 1,111.4 0.5% 
2003 1,001,362.8 214,009.9 17.6% 164,858.8 892.0 0.5% 
2004 1,524,504.0 383,122.5 20.1% 140,560.0 986.7 0.7% 
2005 1,550,280.0 360,824.4 18.9% 115,752.0 1,935.1 1.6% 
 
Source: Korea BondWeb. 
 
Table 4 
Corporate bond investors in Korea 
(percent) 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Sept. 2005  
Banks  5.3 4.9 8.1 12.8 12.8 14.3 12.2 11.5
Bank trusts  10.3 10.4 7.4 6.4 8.1 6.3 5.5 4.4
Investment trust companies  62.4 60.2 29.5 20.8 18.7 11.9 15.3 13.9
Security companies  8.7 12.3 15 13.8 15.5 20 21 23
Insurance companies  2.1 1.5 5.5 7.2 8.9 11.8 11.8 11.8
Pension funds  0 5.6 9.2 10.7 10.4 9.1 6 5.3
Mutual savings banks, credit 
unions, individuals etc. 11.2 5 25.3 28.4 25.6 26.5 28 30.1
 
Source: Korean Securities Depository, from Lee and Kim (2006). 
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Table 5 
Arirang bond issues since 1995 
Issuer name Domicile of issuer 
Local 
credit 
rating 
Issue date  Description 
Amount 
(W 
million)
Asian Development Bank Supranational AAA 01/09/1995  7-year fixed 12.15% 80,000
International Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) 
Supranational AAA 23/04/1997  5-year fixed 9.8% 71,500
European Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) 
Supranational AAA 02/05/1997  5-year fixed 10% 71,100
PT CS Indonesia Indonesia   11/06/1999  3-year fixed 7% 45,000
PT Hanil Jaya Indonesia  A 16/07/1999  3-year fixed 7% 14,000
PT SK Keris Indonesia   29/11/1999  1-year fixed 8% 45,000
PT Indomiwon Citra Indonesia   20/12/1999  1-year fixed 10.8% 20,000
PT Miwon Indonesia TBK Indonesia   16/03/2000  1-year fixed 9% 20,000
PT Indomiwon Citra Indonesia  BBB- 20/12/2000  2-year fixed 10% 10,000
PT Indomiwon Citra Indonesia   28/02/2001  1-year fixed 11.125% 15,000
PT Miwon Indonesia TBK Indonesia  BBB- 16/03/2001  1-year fixed 10.9875% 20,000
SKC Inc. US BBB 03/05/2001  2-year fixed 10.2% 50,000
PT SK Keris Indonesia  BBB 28/05/2001  3-year fixed 9.875% 30,000
Hyundai Assan OSVT Turkey  A- 04/06/2001  3-year fixed 7% 29,000
SKC Inc. US BBB 19/07/2001  2-year fixed 8.6525% 70,000
PT SK Keris Indonesia  BBB 23/07/2001  3-year fixed 8.85% 50,000
SKC Inc. US BBB 06/11/2001  2-year fixed 8.27% 50,000
SPI (Seosan) Cogen Singapore  A 20/12/2001  3-year fixed 7.675% 140,000
SPI (Seosan) Water Singapore  A 20/12/2001  5-year fixed 7.675% 70,000
PT Indomiwon Citra Indonesia  BBB 27/02/2002  1-year fixed 7.26% 16,000
PT CS Indonesia Indonesia  A+ 27/04/2002  1-year fixed 7.32% 100,000
PT Indomiwon Citra Indonesia  BBB 17/10/2002  3-year fixed 6.43% 30,000
SKC Inc. a US BBB+ 02/05/2003  1-year fixed 7.75% 50,000
SKC Inc. a US BBB+ 21/07/2003  1-year fixed 10.02% 70,000
PT SK Keris Indonesia  BBB+ 22/07/2003  2-year fixed 9.2% 50,000
SKC Inc. b, c US BBB+ 06/10/2003  3-year fixed 9.5% 5,000
SKC Inc. b, c US BBB+ 20/10/2003  3-year fixed 9.5% 10,000
SKC Inc. b US BBB+ 06/11/2003  1-year fixed 7.24% 35,000
SKC Inc. US BBB+ 03/05/2004  1-year fixed 6.1% 50,000
SKC Inc. US BBB+ 21/07/2004  1-year fixed 6% 45,000
SPI (Seosan) Water Singapore  A+ 30/11/2004  3-year fixed 50,000
SPI (Seosan) Cogen Singapore  A+ 01/12/2004   3-year fixed 100,000
     Total issues 1,511,600
     Average issue size 47,238
     Average maturity 2.4
     Current outstandings 235,000
 
 
Notes: a MATD; b callable; c private placement. 
Source: Reuters Fixed Income Database.
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Figure 1: 
Does the Issuance of Arirang Bonds Destabilize the USD/Won Exchange Rate? 
 
Figure a: Standard deviation around 0- to 30-day event windows 
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Figure b: Returns (log of daily change) around 0- to 30-day event windows 
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